Defendants.

of Technology; and Does 1-100,

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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs oppose the Federal Defendants' attempt to have this court modify its prior injunction in this case. By this request, the Federal Defendants are clearly seeking to have this Court countermand the emergency injunction entered by the Ninth Circuit on October 5, 2007, and the published ruling on the preliminary injunction issued by the Ninth Circuit on January 11, 2008. The relief sought by Defendants would undermine, if not thwart altogether, these two decisions by the Ninth Circuit, which are binding on this court until and unless overruled by further appellate review.

Specifically, Defendants seek to have this court rule that NASA can proceed with the background investigation and badging process with respect to any "Caltech employees working at JPL for whom the investigation process was completed prior to this Court's January 11 Order." However, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that the entire background investigation process – the collection of private information through the SF-85 and related forms for the purpose of issuance of new identification cards — violates the Administrative Procedures Act, as it has no basis in executive order or statute. Having ruled that the entire background investigation process directed at low risk employees at JPL has no authority in law, the Ninth Circuit's opinion clearly precludes Defendants from continuing to implement *any aspect* of that process. Further, in light of the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the collection of such information for purposes of implementing a background investigation and badging system, on the facts plead in the operative complaint, violates individuals' informational privacy rights under the U.S. Constitution, any further use of such information (including issuance of badges) would pose the same constitutional problems. In short, to permit NASA to continue to use the information it has improperly collected would violate the Ninth Circuit's opinion, which is law of the case in the matter, unless and until it is overturned by en banc or Supreme Court review.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

This suit seeks injunctive and declaratory relief against the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA") as well as various other Federal Defendants based on NASA's requirement that Plaintiffs and the class of low-risk employees they seek to represent comply with an in-depth background investigation put into place at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory ("JPL") pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 ("HSPD-12"). After the denial of Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, the Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, filing an emergency motion for a temporary injunction on October 4, 2007. The Ninth Circuit granted the motion, enjoining Defendants "from requiring appellants to submit the questionnaires for non-sensitive positions, including the authorization form for release of information." (Defs. Exh. A, at 1.)

On January 11, 2008, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion reversing the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that the NACI investigation process should be enjoined on two grounds. First, the court held that requiring this type of open-ended background investigation for low risk employees had no basis in executive order or statute, and thereby violated the Administrative Procedures Act. *Nelson v. NASA*, 2008 U.S.App.LEXIS 498, *14-15 (2008).

Second, the court held that Plaintiffs would likely succeed on their informational privacy claim as the information sought implicated fundamental privacy rights and the government could not establish that the methods for obtaining information – the questions re drug use and counseling, Form 42 and its open-ended questions, and the waiver included as part of Form SF-85 – were narrowly tailored to any legitimate governmental interest.

Based on these holdings, the Ninth Circuit reversed the order denying the preliminary injunction, finding that the district court's "denial of the preliminary injunction was based on errors of law and hence was an abuse of discretion." Id., at * 28. The Ninth Circuit remanded with instructions to the district court to fashion

preliminary injunctive relief consistent with the January 11 opinion.

After reviewing the opinion, this court issued a preliminary injunction in open court on January 11, 2008, stating that "NASA is simply enjoined from moving forward with the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 as it pertains to the JPL property and the Caltech employees until we have a trial on the merits of this case." Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, January 11, 2008, at 26, attached as Exh. B to Defendants' moving papers. Elsewhere in its oral ruling on the preliminary injunction, this court clarified that the order applied to all low-risk employees at JPL. As to such employees, not only the 28 named plaintiffs, the court ruled that "the entire process has been enjoined. There should be no going forward whatsoever with respect to seeking submissions of these questionnaires, applications and beginning the background checks and any other punitive actions against these employees." *Id.*, at 25. The Federal Defendants' counsel, Vesper Mei, stated repeatedly in open court that the entire process should be enjoined and would not be further implemented given the Ninth Circuit decision. See, e.g. Reporter's Transcript, at p. 25, line 17- p. 26, line 10.

ARGUMENT

I. THE FEDERAL DEFENDANTS SEEK TO UNDERMINE OR THWART THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S RULING

Generally, the filing of a notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction over the matters on appeal: this is the principle of exclusive appellate jurisdiction.

Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam);

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Southwest Marine Inc., 242 F. 3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the district court does retain "jurisdiction during the pendency of an appeal to act to preserve the status quo." Southwest Marine, 242 F. 3d at 1166.

This exception to the jurisdictional transfer principle has been codified in Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows a district court to "suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it considers proper for the security of the rights of the adverse

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party." However, this exception

grants the district court no broader power than it has always inherently possessed to preserve the status quo during the pendency of an appeal; it does not restore jurisdiction to the district court to adjudicate anew the merits of the case. Thus, any action taken pursuant to Rule 62(c) may not materially alter the status of the case on appeal.

242 F. 3d at 1166 (citing McClatchy Newspapers v. Central Valley Typographical Union No. 46, 686 F. 2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1982)) (internal quotations omitted).

Pursuant to this authority, the district court was well within its rights to enter a preliminary injunction even prior to issuance of mandate by the court of appeal to ensure implementation of the appellate decision. Southwest Marine, 242 F.3d at 1166. The reason for this authority is obvious. Without the ability to maintain the status quo through the fashioning of a preliminary injunction and ordering compliance therewith, a defendant could work all sorts of mischief during the pendency of an appeal, while awaiting mandate to issue. Indeed, plaintiffs are deeply concerned with the Federal Defendants' efforts to have this court vacate the injunction while the appeal is pending; if they have no intention of disrupting the status quo, why would they be asking this court to vacate the injunction language to which their counsel agreed in court on January 11?

Faced with a clear directive from the Ninth Circuit to enter a preliminary injunction and a defendant eager to continue implementation of a government policy found to be both unconstitutional and in violation of the APA, it was incumbent on the district court to enter a preliminary inunction when it did and to ensure that its reach was as broad as necessary to maintain the status quo and meet the concerns of the appellate court.

The court's order of January 11, 2008 met these concerns by drawing to a halt the entire implementation of HSPD-12 at JPL as it related to low risk employees. In so doing, the court ensured that there would be no further implementation of a plan found

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lacking in all statutory authority. It also ensured that it would apply to all low risk employees at JPL, the group of individuals sought to be represented by Plaintiffs in this class action. This comported with the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the entire background investigation process was suspect for any person working at JPL who was designated as low risk, as well as the Ninth Circuit's acknowledgment that Plaintiffs sought to represent not only themselves, but "a class of JPL employees in non-sensitive or low risk positions." Nelson v. NASA, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 498, at *6-7.

Defendants' request that the court now roll back this preliminary injunction would upset the status quo and potentially undermine the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction over this matter during the pendency of the appeal. First, defendants seek to have the injunction limited "only to those Caltech employees who are working at JPL in low risk positions and who are required to undergo the newly-required background investigations." Plaintiffs' class claims are not so limited, as the Ninth Circuit recognized when it acknowledged that their opinion was directed at "a class of JPL employees in nonsensitive or low risk positions." In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs expressly stated that they brought "this action individually and on behalf of a class of JPL employees in non-sensitive positions." (FAC, Para 61.) There was no requirement that the class member also work for Caltech as opposed to some other entity that might supply employees to JPL. Because the Ninth Circuit found that there was *no legal* authority for implementing any aspect of the background investigation with respect to low risk employees working at NASA facilities, defendants' attempt to limit the preliminary injunction to only Caltech employees at JPL undermines the Ninth Circuit decision. There is certainly no justification, in light of the Ninth Circuit opinion, which would allow NASA to continue to implement the background investigation and badging system for any low risk personnel working at JPL.

Defendants also seek modification of this court's order to allow them to issue badges "to individuals for whom the background investigations are complete." (Defs. Brief, at 4.) Defendants argue that because the government had completed the

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background investigation for many individuals prior to the issuance of this court's January 11 2008 order, they should be permitted to finish that process. However, any further implementation of the background investigation process, including issuance of badges to a select group, would violate the Ninth Circuit's decision and would disturb the status quo while the appeal remains open. First, the Ninth Circuit has held that the entire process of conducting an invasive background investigation of low risk employees is without statutory authority and therefore violative of the APA. The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action found to be . .. not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(c).

Without statutory authority for its actions, the government *cannot continue to* implement any aspect of this system. To rule otherwise, would allow the government to engage in unauthorized activity, in violation of basic principles of administrative law, and then use the "ill gotten" proceeds of such activity to further a plan, found to be without basis in law. Obviously, if the Ninth Circuit's decision is upheld, the government should be banned from using any information gained from an illegal or unconstitutional activity, including the issuance of new badges.

Second, the Ninth Circuit has held that the background investigation likely violates individuals' right to privacy protected by the U.S. Constitution. Under well accepted principles of constitutional law, the government cannot benefit from its own violation of the constitutional rights of its citizenry. If indeed the background investigation process violates informational privacy rights, defendants cannot keep such information or use it for any purpose, including determining which employees receive certain badges and which do not. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1963)("fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine excludes not only illegally obtained evidence, but all evidence derived from exploitation of that evidence; Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 694 (1982)(confession made after an illegal arrest must be excluded when it is the direct result of an unlawful arrest).

While defendants may argue that the issuance of a badge is relatively unimportant,

or even desired perhaps by certain of the affected employees, it must be kept in mind that all low risk employees at JPL currently have acceptable badges; to create a two track system of badges may well penalize those who protested implementation of HSPD-12 or who exercised their constitutional rights to not complete the process by giving a "preferred" badge to those who were most compliant. The issuance of badges to some employees and not to others may well stigmatize those who do not have such a badge, or even deny them entry to certain facilities, while granting access to those with the new badges. Under either scenario, the status quo is not being maintained during appeal and those who have not completed a process found to be illegal and constitutionally suspect will be negatively affected.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court maintain its preliminary injunction as originally ordered. Such injunction should remain in effect until the hearing on the permanent injunction or the courts of appeal issue an order modifying, overruling or restricting the Ninth Circuit's January 11, 2008 opinion. Specifically, this court should deny the Federal Defendants request that the Court clarify that the injunction applies only to Caltech employees at JPL in low-risk positions who are required to fill out Form SF 85 and submit to the background investigation; and that NASA may proceed with the badging of those Caltech employees at JPL for whom the investigation process is complete.

DATED: February 25, 2008

Respectfully Submitted, HADSELL & STORMER, INC.

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Attorneys for All Plaintiffs

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